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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Christopher Thomas appeals contending the district court erred when it denied
his motion for time served

The district court based its decision on the idea that credit is

not properly awarded for discretionary time served as a condition of probation.
However, the district court failed to take into account the recent amendments to the
credit statutes.

Those amendments provide that credit is to be given for periods of

incarceration served as a condition of probation, and, by their plain language, they are
retroactive in scope.
As a result, this Court should reverse the district court's order denying the motion
for credit and remand this case so that an order for the credit to which Mr. Thomas is
entitled might be entered.

To that point, the record and the documents Mr. Thomas

presented in support of his motion demonstrate he is entitled to a total of 734 day of
credit for time served.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Thomas filed a pro se motion requesting that the district court grant him
"credit for all local, county and state time served in conjunction with this charge, and the
resulting sentence imposed by the Court." 1 (Augmentation - Motion.) In support of his
motion, he offered his own affidavit which identified several periods of incarceration for

Trial counsel had filed a generic motion requesting "an order correcting the amount of
credit for time served in the above-entitled case," but there was no evidence presented
with that motion nor were any clarifications made identifying which periods of time
Mr. Thomas was seeking credit for. (R., p.134; see generally R.) As such, when that
motion was denied (R., p.136), Mr. Thomas took it upon himself to file a complete
motion for credit identifying the periods of time he felt were not being properly credited
and he presented evidence in support of his claim. (See Augmentation - Motion;
Augmentation - Affidavit (with documents attached thereto).)
1

1

which he was not receiving credit, as well as documents of his incarceration from the
Ada County Sheriff - six jail booking sheets and one

ree-page serving time history

and from the Idaho Department of Correction (hereinafter, !DOC) - an offender

report

profile and an official time calculation report.

(See generally Augmentation.)

Those

records reveal that Mr. Thomas was incarcerated during the following periods of time:
March 1, 2010, through March 2, 2010 (Augmentation - Jail Booking Sheet);
-

August 9, 2010, through August 12, 2010 (Augmentation - IDOC Official Time
Calculation Report);

-

August 12, 2010, through March 7, 2011 (Augmentation - IDOC Official Time
Calculation Report);
March 7, 2011, through December 3, 2011 (Augmentation - Serving Time
History report, p.1 );

-

April 17, 2012, through April 24, 2012 (Augmentation - Serving Time History
report, p.2); and
June 20, 2013, through January 27, 2014 (Augmentation - Jail Booking
Sheet).

The underlying record revealed one other period of presentence incarceration not
reflected in the records Mr. Thomas presented. The minutes from the July 19, 2010,
sentencing hearing indicate that Mr. Thomas was "remanded to custody" on that date so
the presentence investigator could interview him.

(R., p.45.)

The minutes from the

subsequent sentencing hearing on August 9, 2010, indicated that Mr. Thomas remained
incarcerated at that time. (R., p.52.)

2

By Mr. Thomas' calculation, this amounted to a total of 727 days of time served,
he was only receiving credit for 467 days of that time. 2 (Augmentation - Affidavit,

see R., p.132 (order revoking probation ordering Mr. Thomas be given credit for
467 days of time served).) As such, he requested the district court "re-calculate and recredit my time served" against his unified sentence of eight years, with three years
fixed,

for

delivery

and

possession

with

intent to

deliver methamphetamine. 3

(Augmentation - Affidavit, p.2, R., p.132 (order reducing the initially-imposed sentence
upon revocation of probation).)
The district court denied Mr. Thomas' pro se motion for credit on its merits
because "[t]he Court does not give credit for jail time when it is a term of probation, or
discretionary jail time."

(Augmentation -

Order.)

For example, the period of

incarceration from March 7, 2011, through December 3, 2011, was a period of local
incarceration with a work release option served as a condition of Mr. Thomas' probation.
(Augmentation - Serving Time History report, p.1; R., p.65 (setting forth the terms of
Mr. Thomas' probation).)

Similarly, the period of incarceration from April 17, 2012,

through April 24, 2012, was served as discretionary jail time. (Augmentation - Serving
Time History report, p.2.)

For example, the district court had already clarified Mr. Thomas was receiving credit
for his period of retained jurisdiction (August 11, 2010, through March 7, 2011 ), and so,
denied Mr. Thomas' motion for credit for that particular term of incarceration. (R., p.71
(hand-written notation).)
3 The district court initially retained jurisdiction in Mr. Thomas' case.
(R., p.56.) It
subsequently suspended Mr. Thomas' sentence after he completed the rider program.
(R., pp.64-67.) That period of probation was thereafter revoked, at which time, the
district court reduced and executed Mr. Thomas' sentence. (R., pp.131-32.)
2

3

Mr. Thomas now appeals from that order denying his prose motion. 4

Mr. Thomas had filed a timely notice of appeal from the order denying counsel's
generic motion for credit. (See R., pp.136-41.) The Idaho Supreme Court suspended
that appeal pending resolution of Mr. Thomas' subsequently-filed prose motion. (Order
Suspending Briefing Schedule, dated August 11, 2015.) The Supreme Court thereafter
granted Mr. Thomas' motion to augment the appellate record in this case with all the
documents relevant to his pro se motion for credit for time served. (Order Granting
Motion to Augment and Resume Briefing Schedule, dated August 28, 2015.)
4
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ISSUE
Whether the district

erred by denying Mr. Thomas' motion for credit for time

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Thomas' Motion For Credit For Time Served

A

The Amendments To The Credit Statutes Allowing For Credit For Time Served
As A Condition Of Probation Are Retroactive, And So, Control In Mr. Thomas'
Case
The district court denied Mr. Thomas' motion for credit because "[t]he Court does

not give credit for jail time when it is a term of probation, or discretionary jail time."
(Augmentation - Order.) However, the Legislature recently amended the credit statutes
(I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603) to provide precisely the opposite. As amended, I.C. § 18309(2) provides:
In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been withheld
and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and is later
imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed
shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration
served as a condition of probation under the original withheld or
suspended judgment
(emphasis added). Similarly, LC.§ 19-2603, as amended, provides:
When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and
conditions of probation, it may, if judgment has been withheld, pronounce
any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if judgment
was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation The time
such person shall have been at large under such suspended sentence
shall not be counted as a part of the term of his sentence. The defendant
shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a bench
warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the
defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time served
following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227, Idaho
Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under the
withheld judgment or suspended sentence.
(emphasis added). These amendments also superseded the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Banks, which held that defendants were not entitled to credit for time
served as a condition of their probation. See State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608 (1992).

6

"In general, legislation acts prospectively."

Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928,

(2014). However, there are some cases where a new piece of legislation or an
amendment to an existing statute will be retroactive in effect.

See, e.g., id. at 938

(specifically considering an amendment to an existing statute to have retroactive effect).
As the Idaho Supreme Court explained, "'a statute should be applied retroactively only if
the legislature has clearly expressed that intent or such intent is clearly implied by the
language of the statute."' Id. (quoting Kent v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 93 Idaho 618,
621 (1970); cf Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr, 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011)
(holding that courts are to give effect to the plain language of the statute when the
statute is unambiguous).
For example, the Guzman Court explained, '"if the language clearly refers to the
past as well as the future, then the intent to make the law retroactive is expressly
declared within the meaning of [the statute]."'

Guzman, 155 Idaho at 938 (quoting

Peavy v. Mccombs, 26 Idaho 143, 151 (1914)) (bracketed text amended). As such, an

amendment to a statute which provided, "'[w]henever any ... herd district . . . has
heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, declared to be created ... by an order,' '[n]o
challenge to ... such an order, shall be heard or considered after seven (7) years has
lapsed from the date of the order,"' clearly expressed the legislative intent for that
amendment to be retroactive in scope. Guzman, 155 Idaho at 938 (quoting I.C. § 31857) (ellipses from original). The reason was "[t]his language referencing 'any' order
that 'has heretofore been, or shall hereafter be'" referred to both past and future events,
thus making that portion of the statute retroactive. Id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court held that statutory language providing:
"'[T]he administration of all rights to the use of ground water, whenever or however

7

acquired or to be acquired, shall, unless specifically excepted therefrom, be governed
the provisions of this act,'" also made the statute retroactive in scope "by the express
language in [that section] of the original act." A & B Irr. Dist. v. Idaho Dept. of Water
Resources, 153 Idaho 500, 508 (2012) (quoting 1951 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 200). As

in Guzman, it was the inclusion of "all rights ... whenever or however acquired or to be
acquired," thus referring to past and future events, which demonstrated the intent for the
statute to be retroactive. See id. (emphasis added).
The Idaho Supreme Court has also applied this rule to statutory amendments
which alter the consequences of a criminal conviction. See State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho
849, 851 (2012) (considering whether an amendment to the sex offender registration act
was retroactive).

In Forbes, the Supreme Court determined the statutory amendment

had retroactive effect because "the Legislature, by implication, intended the amendment
to apply to offenders who have already been granted a withheld judgment," even though
the relevant code section also provided "'[n]o part of these comp[il]ed laws is retroactive
unless expressly so declared."' Id. (quoting I.C. § 73-101 ). Specifically, the amendment
provided: '"A judgment of conviction for a violation of any offense requiring sex offender
registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, shall not be subject to dismissal
or reduction under this section."' 5 Id. (quoting 2006 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 157). As in
Guzman and A & B Irr. Dist., it was the language "for any offense" which expressly

declared the intent for that amendment to be retroactive. 6 See id. (emphasis added);

The amendment continued, but only to provide that "[a] conviction for the purposes of
this chapter means that the person has pied guilty or has been found guilty,
notwithstanding the form of the judgment or withheld judgment." See 2006 Idaho Sess.
Laws Ch. 157.
6 That conclusion was bolstered by the fact that the Court had already determined this
amendment did not violate the protections against ex post facto laws. Forbes, 152
Idaho at 851 (citing State v. Hardwick, 150 Idaho 580, 581-82 (2011 )).
5
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cf Tugade v. Hoy, 265 F.2d 63, 65 (9th Cir. 1959) (holding "[t]he statute, § 241 (a)(11)
as amended, 70 Stat. 575 (1956), by its terms is specifically made retroactive to one
'who at any time has been convicted of .
of.

any law ... relating to the illicit possession

narcotic drugs .... "') (ellipses from original, emphasis added). As such, it did not

matter when the judgment was entered; the amendment's effect was still made
retroactive by the statutory language, and so, would impact on cases in which the
judgment had already been entered. See Forbes, 152 Idaho at 851.
Like the statutory amendment at issue in Forbes, as well as the statutes at issue
in Guzman and A & B Irr. Dist., the language of the 2015 amendments to the credit
statutes expresses a clear intent for those amendments to be retroactive in scope:
In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been withheld
and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and is later
imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered or imposed
shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration served
as a condition of probation under the original withheld or suspended
judgment.

The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service
of a bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to
believe the defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time
served following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227,
Idaho Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under
the withheld judgment or suspended sentence.
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 99 (amending I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 respectively)
(emphasis added). Just "[a]s the GWA[7] governs all water rights whenever acquired,
[and] I.C. § 31-857 governs all herd district ordinances whenever enacted," the
amendments to I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 govern all periods of incarceration served
as conditions of release on probation, whenever enforced. Guzman, 155 Idaho at 938;

7

The Ground Water Act, which was at issue in A & B Irr. Dist.
9

compare also Forbes, 152 Idaho at 851 (holding the amendment to the sex offender

registration act governs all judgments of conviction for sex offenses, whenever entered)
Thus, by using the term "any," thereby referring to past and future periods of
incarceration served as a condition of release on probation, the language of the 2015
amendments to the credit statutes expressly declared that those amendments were
retroactive in scope. And, as in Forbes, that language also demonstrates that the time
the judgment was entered is irrelevant to the operation of the amended statutes.
Compare Forbes, 152 Idaho at 851.

As a result, the 2015 amendments control the

credit calculation in Mr. Thomas' case.

B.

Mr. Thomas Presented Sufficient Evidence To Show The Credit Calculation In
His Case Was Erroneously Low
Mr. Thomas requested that the district court grant him "credit for all local, county

and state time served in conjunction with this charge, and the resulting sentence
imposed by the Court." (Augmentation - Motion.) The records he presented in support
of that motion identify 714 days during which Mr. Thomas was incarcerated on this
case:
-

A term of 2 days from March 1, 2010, through March 2, 2010 (Augmentation Jail Booking Sheet), following his initial arrest in this case (see R., pp.9-10
(complaint filed March 2, 201 O);

-

A term of 4 days from August 9, 2010, through August 12, 2010
(Augmentation -

IDOC Official time Calculation Report), between the

sentencing hearing and official placement in an !DOC facility (see R., p.56
Uudgment of conviction ordering Mr. Thomas' commitment as of August 9,
2010);
10

-

A term of 207 days 8 from August 12, 2010, through March 7, 2011
(Augmentation

IDOC Official Time Calculation Report), while Mr. Thomas

was serving a period of retained jurisdiction (see R., p.63 (minutes from the
rider review hearing held on March 7, 2011);
-

A term of 271 days 9 from March 7, 2011, through December 3, 2011
(Augmentation - Serving Time History report, p.1 ), while Mr. Thomas served
a period of work release as a term of his probation (see R., p.65 (setting the
terms of Mr. Thomas' probation):

-

A term of 8 days from April 17, 2012, through April 24, 2012 (Augmentation Serving Time History report, p.2), while Mr. Thomas served a period of
discretionary jail time (see R , p.65 (authorizing discretionary time as a term
of Mr. Thomas' probation); and

-

A term of 222 days from June 20, 2013, through January 27, 2014
(Augmentation

Jail Booking Sheet), between his arrest and the ultimate

disposition on an allegation of probation violation (see R., p.83 (agent's
warrant served on June 20, 2013); R., p.130 (minutes of disposition hearing
held on January 27, 2014).
Additionally, the appellate record reveals that Mr. Thomas was incarcerated for a
term of 21 days 10 from July 19, 2010, through August 9. 2010. The minutes from the
July 19, 2010, sentencing hearing indicate that Mr. Thomas was "remanded to custody"

One day is removed from this term calculation so August 12, 2010, is not double
counted.
9 One day is removed from this term calculation so March 7, 2011, is not double
counted.
10 One day is removed from this term calculation so August 9, 2010, is not double
counted.
8

11

so that the presentence investigator could interview him

(R., p.45.) The minutes from

subsequent sentencing hearing indicate Mr. Thomas remained in custody as of
August

2010. (R., p.52.) That brings the total time for which Mr. Thomas should be

receiving credit to 734 days.
Mr. Thomas recognizes that he only calculated, and thus, only specifically
requested credit for a total of 727 days of incarceration. (Augmentation - Affidavit, p.2.)
However, his motion was for credit for all the time to which he is entitled, and that would
include all the periods of incarceration discussed infra. (See Augmentation - Motion.)
Ultimately, though, "a district court may only give credit for the correct amount of time
actually served by the defendant prior to imposition of judgment; the district court does
not have discretion to award credit for time served that is either more or less than that."
State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 21 (Ct. App 2014). Therefore, the fact that Mr. Thomas

may have miscalculated the total number of days to which he is entitled credit should
not preclude the courts from properly calculating and subsequently ordering credit for
the time he was actually incarcerated.
Thus, the record shows Mr. Thomas served 734 days of incarceration prior to the
order revoking his probation and executing his sentence. Under the retroactive 2015
amendments to the credit statutes, Mr. Thomas is entitled to credit against his sentence
for all that time actually served on this case. However, he is only receiving credit for
467 days. (Augmentation - Affidavit, p.2; R., p.132.) Since the district court's decision
to deny Mr. Thomas' motion to correct that error on a rationale superseded by the
retroactive 2015 amendments (see Augmentation - Order), this Court should reverse
that decision.

12

CONCLUSION
Mr. Thomas respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying his motion
credit for time served and remand this case for entry of an order for all the credit to
which he is entitled.
DATED this 1st day of October, 2015.

4,,1~

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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